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UROPEAN 
EADLINES
N egotia tions about 
nuclear missiles In Europe 
take place behind closed 
doors In Geneva. As the 
deadline approaches for 
the new generation of 
missiles to be deployed, 
the movement Is growing 
and debating Its options.
One of the most active 
centres for disarmament Is 
the Dutch Interchurch 
Peace Council (IKV). It 
discusses the Issues, 
describes the movement 
and offers a solution 
towards nuclear dis­
armament.
D u tch
In te rc h u rc h
P e a c e
C o u n cil
In recent years the European peace movement has grown tremend­ously. In 1981 it organised the 
la rg e s t  a n t i - n u c le a r  w e a p o n s  
demonstrations ever held in Europe. It 
has won massive support from all 
layers of the population. It has 
succeeded in winning some important 
political parties to its views or to 
positions close to it. In several 
countries it is very close to the 
churches. And it has forced two NATO 
governments to postpone a decision to 
deploy new nuclear missiles on their 
territory. Nevertheless, the aim to 
b e g in  a p ro c e s s  o f n u c le a r  
disarmament, through independent 
first steps by European countries, has 
not yet come about.
Increasingly, energy is absorbed by 
efforts to stop a new generation of 
nuclear weapons from coming into 
Europe rather than getting the existing 
ones out. This struggle is heading fora 
climax at the end of 1983.
A new and hopeful factor is that the 
peace movement now realises that it is 
part of a worldwide mass movement 
that is operating on an international 
scale to halt the madness of the 
nuclear arms race. Two important 
examples are the churches in the GDR 
(East Germany) which have taken new 
initiatives, and the growing movement 
in the Pacific to stop French nuclear 
tests.
in Europe, the rapid rise of the US 
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign 
has been welcomed with particular 
enthusiasm. From its very beginning 
we have been in close contact with it. 
We have been impressed to see how it 
found massive support among the 
American people in a very short time, 
irrespective of social and political 
differences. Fear of nuclear war, 
c o n c e rn  a b o u t new  w e a p o n  
developments in both East and West,
which signal the trend toward nuclear 
w a r f ig h t in g ,  u n e a s in e ss  a b o u t 
bellicose rhetoric and disenchantment 
w ith  arms con tro l-as-usua l are 
common elements of our movements.
Deadlines in Europe: 1983
W e see the 'Freeze' as a time- urgent proposal. Its immed­iate goal is to stop the new generation of nuclear weapons which 
is in the making in both East and West, 
and which will put a hair-trigger on 
nuclear war. We in Europe feel the 
pressure of time very directly. In 
December 1983 NATO wants to begin 
the deployment of the first US 
Pershing II and cruise missiles. Forthe 
first time in history, Western Europe 
will serve as a launching platform for 
extremely accurate US strategic 
missiles targeted at the Soviet Union.
Should these missiles be deployed, 
the prospects of achieving a US-Soviet 
freeze on all new nuclear weapons will 
be seriously undermined.
In December 1979, NATO made its 
so-called double track decision: to 
deploy 572 US missiles in five Western 
European countries and to offer 
negotiations to the Soviet Union. This 
led to a series of protests in many 
European countries, which climaxed in 
the unprecedented mass demonstrat­
ions in the autumn of 1981, when three 
million people marched the streets of 
Western European cities.
S in ce  th e n , o p p o s it io n  has 
continued to grow. Some examples: 
peace camps were organised at many 
nuclear weapons storage sites. In 
Sicily, where the first cruise missiles 
are due to arrive by the end of 1983, 
more than a million signatures (more 
than half of the adult population) were 
collected within two months in 1982. In
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December 1982, in a symbolic action 
involving non-violent civil disobed­
ience, some 30,000 women 'embraced' 
the cruise missile base near Greenham 
Common in England to protect the 
world from its evil.
In West Germany, the Social 
Democratic Party has gradually shifted 
|to a much more critical position with 
frespect to the Euromissiles question 
and 'th e  G reens ', who re jec t 
deployment unconditionally, won a 
number of seats in Parliament in the 
recent elections. In Belgium also the 
peace movement keeps growing, and 
in the N etherlands, governm ent 
leaders have publicly stated their 
doubt that a deployment decision 
could be implemented w ithout lasting 
damage to the cohesion of society.
In those NATO countries where no 
missiles are to be deployed, opposition 
has also grown. In Canada, the plans to 
test US cruise missiles are strongly 
protested. In Denmark and Norway, 
the public unrest about the missiles 
became evident in their parliaments; 
Denmark voted to withhold the 
p a y m e n t o f  t h e i r  s h a re  o f 
infrastructure costs of the NATO 
program, in Norway the same proposal 
lost by only one vote. Greece refuses to 
agree to the deployment paragraphs in 
NATO communiques and promotes 
initiatives for a nuclear-free zone in the 
Balkans.
In Denmark, parliament forced the 
government to step out of line when all 
NATO countries were supposed to 
vote no to a Freeze resolution in the 
United Nations. (In the Netherlands a 
similar resolution failed to pass in 
parliament by only the smallest 
m arg in .) M oreover, the D anish 
parliament recently voted not to agree 
with deployment as long as the Geneva 
negotiations are still under way.
Permanent testimony of the public 
resistance in Europe appears in the 
various opinion polls. Opposition in 
the various European countries to the 
NATO decision was substantial from 
the beginning and has been growing 
considerably ever since.
new US missiles in Europe. When the 
nature and implications of the decision 
became better known to the public, 
o p p o s itio n  a ga in s t d e p lo ym en t 
increased dramatically. In all the polls 
there now appears a hard core of 40-50 
percent of the population which rejects 
deployment unconditionally. About 30 
percent prefer to make their answer 
dependent on the arms control 
negotiations in Geneva. Faced with a 
d irec t question  (yes or no to 
deployment), half of these reject 
deployment as well. This means that 
about tw o -th ird s  of the Dutch 
population (more than 60 percent) 
oppose deployment.
In the other four deployment 
countries the opposition has also 
grown considerably in the past two to 
three years. In Great Britain, according 
to Marplan (The Guardian, January 21, 
1983), 61 percent of the population 
disapprove of deployment of cruise
misguided phrasing ofthequestionsin 
the poll (Gallup, January 17, 1983, 
Berlingske Tidende), 51 percent 
thought it wrong to deploy new US 
missiles as an answer to a Soviet 
threat.
Democracy
W hy is it that these figures are so little reflected in the official politics of the European governments? In only one of the five 
NATO countries where, according to 
the December 1979 decision, new 
nuclear missiles were to be deployed, 
this decision was subjected to proper 
parliamentary debate prior to the 
decision. This was the Netherlands, 
and there parliament voted against it. 
However, in NATO unanimity is 
traditionally considered a political 
imperative of the utmost importance. 
For instance, late in 1982, Western
"But what else is there to do other than demonstrate again and 
again .... that the majority of people do not want these new 
missiles?"
I n the Netherlands, a poll which was taken in November 1979, before the NATO decision, showed some 37 percent of the population in favour and 
25 percent against deployment of the
missiles and 27 percent are in favour. 
Unconditional opposition in that 
country doubled in the course of 1981 
(from 23 percent to 46 percent). A 
similar process can be seen in the 
Federa l R e p u b lic  o f G erm any. 
Unconditional opposition increased 
from 29 percent in July 1981 to 47 
percent in January 1982.
According to Der Spiegel magazine, 
the Bonn g o ve rn m e n t has an 
unpublished study by the Sinus 
Institute in Munich in which 61 percent 
of those polled favour postponement 
of deployment if, by October 1983, 
there is still no agreement in Geneva. 
In June 1983, a poll by ZDF television 
showed that the percentage favouring 
postponement had increased to 72 
percent. In Italy, in October 1981, 60 
percent opposed the new missiles on 
the basis of a simple yes or no 
question. A poll in July 1983 again 
showed 60 percent against. In 
Belgium, (L'Evenement, 1 October
1982) in 1981, 50.2 percent were 
against deployment of new missiles on 
their territory, whereas in 1980 this 
figure was only 41.7 percent.
As to other NATO countries: in 
Norway (December 1982), 69 percent 
opposed deployment in Europe. In 
Denmark, despite very biased and
European governments even had to 
officially endorse President Reagan's 
newest MX missile deployment plan 
because not to do so would be seen in 
Moscow as a sign of division within 
NATO and — more importantly — the 
R eagan a d m in is tra t io n  needed 
European support against growing 
opposition within the US. Virtually no 
European government really liked the 
Reagan plan, but none dared to say so.
The NATO double track decision has 
gradually become the main test case 
for demonstrating the unity and 
resolve of the alliance and thus serves 
a political rather than a military 
purpose. Many Western European 
politicians who were in power in 1979 
and are no longer today, now admit 
that the NATO decision was a mistake. 
But these governments cannot afford 
this luxury and will be most reluctant to 
drop the commitments of 1979 to 
deploy new missiles, despite the 
inevitable high political costs. The 
people in Europe will become more 
and more alienated from the political 
process as leaders continue to 
disregard sincere convictions and 
concerns.
The peace movement believes in 
democracy. But what else is there to do 
other than demonstrate again and
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2 again, in the polls and on the streets, 
I  that the majority of the people do not 
5' want these new missiles? The talks in 
a Geneva cannot stop them. Govern- 
< ments are paralysed by the demand of 
£  unanimity in NATO. The movement 
"* must now count on the help of the 
American people to make democracy 
work. The Freeze movement in the 
USA supports the European struggle 
to stop the new missiles; while also 
calling on the Soviet Union to reduce 
its intermediate-range missiles aimed 
at Europe.
The movement appeals to the 
American people to urge Congress to 
oppose the fund ing  o f testing, 
p ro d u c tio n  and d e p lo y m e n t o f 
Pershing II and cruise missiles and to 
halt all efforts to begin deployment of 
the missiles in December 1983.
The argument
r ig in a lly , the reason fo r  
W |  NATO's modernisation plan 
was not the growing offensive 
force of the Soviet Union (particularly 
the SS-20 missile) but its increased 
defensive potential, in particular its air 
defence. NATO said its aging 
bombers could no longer penetrate. By 
1979, th e  o f f ic ia l  a rg u m e n ts  
underlying NATO's 'double track' 
decision had shifted. At that time the 
most prominent argument was that 
there had grown a substantia l 
asymmetry in Europe with respect to 
la n d -b a s e d  s y s te m s  fo r  th e  
intermediate range.
Because of the parity between the 
Soviet Union and the USA in strategic 
systems, to be codified in Salt II, this 
regional imbalance was seen as 
undercutting the credibility of the 
West's nuclear deterrent and as a 
potential cause of political blackmail 
by Moscow. This argument focused on 
the replacement of the almost 20-year 
old Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles by 
the SS-20, a multiple warhead (MIRV) 
missile of greater range and accuracy. 
NATO claimed to have no 'answer' to 
this threat, although already, before 
the first SS-20 appeared, the US sea- 
launched missiles so far 'countering' 
the SS-4 and SS-5 had been 'Mirv'ed. 
Later, when public resistance to 
d e p lo y m e n t g rew , th e  o f f ic ia l  
argument changed again. Originally, 
the negotiation 'track' had been added 
to the deployment 'track' to make 
deployment acceptable by public 
opinion. Now this was reversed. Going 
on with deployment was called 
necessary for the success of the 
negotiations. (The outcome would, of 
course, be the same: deployment.)
The peace movement in Europe has 
consistently expressed its opposition
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to the SS-20 program. It also opposes 
the current and equally impressive 
modernisation plans of French and 
British nuclear weapons. All current 
nuclear weapons modernisation in 
Europe (Soviet, American, French and 
B rit is h ) p o in t to w a rds  n uc lea r 
warfighting and the SS-20 is clearly 
one of the most threatening of today's 
missiles. But "response" to this new 
Soviet modernisation round makes the 
situation even more dangerous, for a 
number of reasons.
•  It is again one more step in the 
nuclear arms race between the 
superpowers that has been going on 
for too long already. It will not bring 
more security in Europe. If American 
cruise missiles and Pershing I Is will be 
deployed, the Soviet Union will 
respond again with new weapons on its 
side. Such reasoning reflects a 
dangerous fixation on comparisons 
between various weapon systems and 
playing the 'numbers game', although 
there are already far more nuclear 
warheads than conceivable targets.
•  Qualitatively, this new step is even 
more dangerous. This new generation 
of nuclear weapons of extreme 
accuracy changes the s tra teg ic  
situation of Europe and feeds Soviet 
anxieties about the trends towards a 
US first strike capability. The Pershing 
II, once deployed, will be the most 
accurate missile in the world, the first 
b a llis tic  m issile  of the com ing 
generation of 'first strike' nuclear 
weapons. The trend towards nuclear 
warfighting postures, which is the 
guideline of the current modernisation 
both in East and West, is a special 
cause of great uneasiness in Europe. 
To see Europe as the theatre of a 
possible 'lim ited' nuclear war is utter 
nonsense.
• That the dep loym ent of US 
E u rom iss ile s  is a response to 
European concerns is only partly true. 
Long before such concerns were 
expressed (for instance late in 1977 by 
Chancellor Schmidt), the US Air Force 
was already planning to deploy 
ground-launched cruise missiles at 
three NATO bases. Today, the issue of 
the Euromissiles must be seem as part 
of the overall strategy of the US 
administration to develop a position of 
military superiority towards the Soviet 
Union. The peace movement in Europe 
is certainly not anti-American. But it is 
very concerned about the ideological, 
moral, even religious rhetoric which 
the Reagan administration uses to 
underline its foreign policy and its 
relation to the Soviet Union in 
particular. Whatever the movement 
may think of the socio-political system
of the Soviet Union and the policies of 
its leaders — and the peace movement 
in Western Europe expresses its 
criticism in this respect quite frankly, 
which has led some Soviet officials to 
call us CIA agents — defining the 
relations with the Soviet Union in terms 
of "a struggle between right and 
wrong, good and evil", talking of the 
Soviet Union as "an evil empire” , and 
considering a continuation of a forced 
arms race and economic sanctions as 
appropriate means to get the Soviet 
Union on its knees, is endangering 
world peace. New efforts for detente 
are of vital interest for Europe. The 
deployment, for the first time in 
history, of such extremely accurate US 
missiles in Europe targeted at the 
Soviet Union means further escalation 
of tension and confrontation.
•  In strictly m ilitary terms there have 
always been doubts about the real
need for deployment of cruise missiles 
and Pershing Its in Europe. Since, after 
the Cuban m issilecrisisof 1962, the US 
replaced its land-based missiles with 
bombers and missiles on submarines, 
the Soviet Union has had a virtual 
monopoly in Europe with respect to 
land-based  in te rm e d ia te  range 
missiles. NATO did not find reason at 
that time to 'match' this threat with 
land-based missiles of its own. Its 
potential in submarine and air-based 
systems was considered an adequate 
compensation; this potential has 
continuously been, and is contin­
uous ly  be ing , m odern ised  and 
expanded.
• From the beginning, the political 
arguments were the most important: 
NATO's desire to show resolve and 
cohesion after some nasty conflicts 
betw een P re s id en t C a rte r and 
Chancellor Schmidt. But, in fact, the 
NATO decision has proved to be one of 
the most divisive issues in its history.
•  Deployment of Euromissiles as 
scheduled for 1983 will also be a 
serious setback for the American 
peace movement because of the 
qualitative dimensions and the fact 
that verification will be much more 
difficult to achieve. Cruise missiles are
difficult to count and can't be used with 
e ith e r co n ve n tio n a l or n uc lea r 
warheads.
Geneva
F or a number of reasons, the peace movement in Western Europe has been, and still is, very critical and 
sceptical about the possible outcomes 
of the Geneva talks.
— It is acknowledged in many (semi) 
official reports that in 1979 the 
negotiation 'track' was added to the 
deployment 'track' to pacify public 
opinion and to legitimise deployment.
— Contents and timing of the various 
proposals that have been made (zero- 
option, interim-proposal) all suggest 
that their purpose continues to be to 
appease European public opinion 
rather than to achieve real results. The 
outcome will be deployment, full or 
partial.
— European countries do not sit at the 
tab le  in Geneva, but are only 
consulted.
— Only lately and under heavy 
European pressure did the Reagan 
administration start the negotiations in 
Geneva at all.
Most important, and scarcely known 
by the public and many politicians 
alike, is that since the beginning 
NATO's negotiation approach has 
been determined by the search for a 
separate 'Eurostrategic balance': the 
NATO 1979 decis ion  demanded 
'equality' between the US and the 
USSR in land-based missiles, thus 
focusing on the only type of weapon 
systems of which NATO had none and 
the Soviet Union had a great 
preponderance, and excluding all 
systems (air-based and sea-based) 
which so far had been regarded as 
countering these Soviet land-based 
missiles.
President Reaqan's 'zero-option' of 
November 1981 sounded appealing 
('zero') but in fact represented an even 
to u g h e r  a p p ro a c h . 'Z e ro ' (no  
deployment of US missiles in Europe) 
was only possible if the Soviet Union 
c o m p le te ly  d is m a n tle d  a ll  its  
intermediate range missiles it had 
deployed since 1959, not just those
"In reality, these talks do not aim at controlling the arms race 
but at controlling public protest against the arms race."
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targeted at Europe. This approach was 
purely propagandistic; it was certain 
that Moscow would reject it because it 
now added the Soviet missiles targeted 
at China to the equation and continued 
tJ exclude all French and British 
missiles targeted at the Soviet Union.
In December 1982, Andropov 
responded in kind with what he called 
"a really honest zero-option": no new 
US missiles, no Soviet missiles to 
counter them, only (!) 162 Soviet 
misssiles to counterthe 162 British and 
French m iss iles . A lth o u g h  th is  
proposal entailed the dismantling of 
several dozen SS-20s, its acceptance 
was equally unlikely because of its 
explicit link with the British and French 
nuclear forces, thereby (politically) 
trying clearly to uncouple Western 
European security from US security.
For the peace movement, both 
approaches are unacceptable. Both 
kinds of a separate 'Eurostrategic 
balance' would mean a new, separate 
Eurostrategic arms race. The one 
would introduce a new generation of 
US missiles, the other would legitimise 
both the SS-20 and the British and 
French nuclear programs. Britain and 
France are even planning to have more 
warheads on their missiles in the 
'nineties than the total Soviet SS-4, SS-
5 and SS-20 force of today. Andropov 
clearly had this in mind when, in May 
1983, he offered to count not only 
missiles but warheads as well, thereby 
hardening his position; to match the 
French and British modernisation 
programs, Moscow will need more 
than 162 3-warhead SS-20s.
Reagan's 'interim offer’ (March
1983) does not change the basic 
position at all. It means: the US will 
deploy as many new weapons as the 
Soviet Union wants to keep. So, the US 
will go up (in land-based missiles) to 
the level where the Soviet Union will go 
down. The only thing worth noting 
about Reagan's newest 'offer' is that it 
should finally end the illusion, so 
cherished by governments and many 
political parties in Europe, that Geneva 
can produce 'zero' (no deployment). 
Already, since 1979, the framework 
agreed upon by NATO means that 
any outcome of Geneva will mean the 
coming of a new generation of 
missiles. Given this framework, to 
negotiate means to deploy. Only the 
numbers are negotiable. In December 
1979, many supporters of the double 
track decision said that deploying 572 
new missiles was, of course, too much, 
but the negotiation-track could bring 
the number down to some 300. 
Reagan's newest offer is widely 
understood as meaning: let’s settle for 
some 300. The peace movement 
despairs of governments and many
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Dutch posters against the
neutron bomb.
politicians who, for years, have been 
paralysed by 'Geneva'. They called 
for ’zero' and, at the same time, since 
1979 they have agreed to a negotiation 
approach which makes certain that 
both without and with an agreement 
the deployment of new missiles will 
start in December 1983!
The fact that nothing has happened 
in Geneva so far, however, does not 
mean that nothing will happen in the 
coming months. Both parties have an 
interest in some kind of 'arms control' 
deal: NATO and the US to sell 
deployment to public opinion (which 
has been the pu rpose  o f the
negotiations since 1979), and the 
Soviet Union to get things moving in 
the START talks and not to have to 
carry out its own threats, like 
suspending all negotiations (in any 
case, START and INF) after the first 
deployments, and deploying missiles 
J in closer range of the US (though not in 
; Cuba as in 1962), also deploying more 
' missiles in East European countries, 
etc.
Suspension
W hatever the outcom e of Geneva, the peace movement in Western Europe continues to  re a ff irm  its  u n c o n d it io n a l 
oppos ition  to any new m issile 
deployments, even as part of an 
'interim solution'. Instead, it calls for a 
suspension or delay of any further 
implementation of the NATO decision 
(of both of its tracks because both lead 
to deployment) in order to create time 
for establishing a new negotiation 
framework in Geneva. Several leading 
politicians have suggested creative 
alternative approaches which, so far, 
could not be discussed at government 
level because of 'Geneva'. Any 
a lterna tive  proposal is seen as 
'undermining' the US negotiation 
position. Moreover, the weapons issue 
should be discussed in awide context 
of East-West problems in Europe. 
Detente and disarmament have to be 
linked.
The current framework in Geneva 
can only lead to further escalation (a 
separate Eurostrategic balance) and to 
confrontation. The deployment of the 
first new missiles in December 1983 
may even derail the whole East-West 
arms control process for at least 
several years. Geneva is speeding up 
the arms race because so many 
officials now say: the sooner we start 
deployment, the sooner Moscow will 
make concessions. In reality, these 
talks do not aim at controlling the arms 
race but at controlling public protest 
against the arms race.
Negotiations are needed, but thei; 
framework should be such that they 
can produce steps towards a solution. 
The movement is asking European 
governments to stop being paralysed 
by 'Geneva', to respond to the 
majority, and to finally take initiatives 
to prevent the crisis of 1983. The 
movement asks the Soviet Union to 
make a start with dismantling its 
missiles, both old and new. And we ask 
the US people to urge Congress to 
prevent the deployment of this new 
generation of US missiles.
The Dutch Interchurch Peace 
Council (IKV) Is one of the moat 
act i ve  cent res wor k i ng  for  
dlaarmament In western Europe.
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